The Bridgeville Area Historical Society ended a very impressive 2023/2024 program series with Glenn Flickinger’s presentation of “The Air War over Europe”. This general subject is a familiar one to regular attendees of this series. We have had presentations (by my brother Joe) on his book “Almost Forgotten”, chronicling servicemen from this area who lost their lives while in the service, including World War II airmen Samuel Allender, Wayne Carson, and Joseph Kasprzak; on the remarkable tale of airmen George Shady, George Abood, and Peter Calabro, childhood friends repatriated from the same POW camp; and on Santo Magliocca, who survived 21 missions on a B-24 Liberator and lived happily ever after, even serving a stint as President of the Bridgeville Borough Council. These presentations were all heavy on specific details; in contrast Mr. Flickinger presented a comprehensive overview of the general topic, permitting the audience to place each of the individual talks in perspective.
The speaker began by describing the US Army Air Corps at the beginning of World War II and emphasizing the monumental job that was done transforming it into the powerful US Army Air Forces it became four years later. In 1939 The Air Corps had fewer than 25,000 personnel and eight hundred combat aircraft, most of which soon proved to be obsolete. By the end of the war the Air Forces personnel numbered over two million, with 80,000 effective planes. General Henry “Hap” Arnold is credited with being the architect of this transformation. A West Pointer, Arnold became involved in aviation in its early days. After instruction by the Wright Brothers he became the third Army officer to be certified as a pilot. Arnold’s obvious capability eventually resulted in his becoming Chief of the Air Corps in 1938. His protégées – Carl Spaatz, Ira Eaker, Jimmy Doolittle, and Curtis LeMay – were major contributors to this transformation.
The speaker explained the difference between two different missions for our air forces in Europe, tactical and strategic. In the short term, our ground forces needed tactical support – establishing local air superiority that prevents enemy aircraft from attacking our troops and allows our planes to punish enemy ground troops, armor, and artillery. In contrast, the strategic mission is to destroy the enemy’s infrastructure and manufacturing capability, hence his ability to support and supply his ground troops. Obviously the two missions require different aircraft, different organizations, and different overall responsibility. For example, the Republic P-47 Thunderbolt was an excellent ground support aircraft, but lacked the range to be effective supporting strategic bombing. Conversely, once they were outfitted with two-stage supercharged Rolls-Royce engines, the North American P-51 Mustang was ideal as an escort for the B-17’s and B-24’s on their strategic raids deep into the German heartland. Over 15,000 of each of planes were manufactured as part of the war effort.
Both the Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress and the Consolidated B-24 Liberator were major contributors to the strategic bombing effort in Europe. The B-24 holds the record for most military aircraft produced – 18,500; in contrast, only 12,700 B-17’s were built. Fully equipped, the B-17 weighed twenty-seven tons and could carry a payload of ninety-six hundred pounds at a maximum speed of 287 mph and altitude of 35,000 feet. The B-24’s weight and capability were comparable to the B-17 although its cruising speed was slightly higher and its maximum altitude lower. Flight crews preferred the B-17 because of its durability and defensive firepower; the General Staff preferred the B-24 because it was easier to manufacture.
Mr. Flickinger discussed in detail the early years of the Air War and the heavy losses the Air Forces took in 1943 and early 1944. Two B-17 raids on a ball-bearing plant in Schweinfurt, deep in southern Germany suffered the biggest losses of any individual mission – 36 aircraft out of 230 on August 17, 1943 and 77 out of 291 on October 14, 1943. A total of 850 airmen were lost on those two missions. The fact that the three Bridgeville airmen mentioned above sacrificed their lives in a six-week period in November and December,1943, is grim confirmation of the horror of those days. Fortunately, by Spring 1944 the tide had turned and the Allies had achieved air superiority. This appears to have been due to a combination of factors – attrition of the German air defense capability at a time the Allies were continuing to grow stronger, recognition that high level bombers still required fighter support and the changes that were made to provide it, and the cumulative effect of our strategic bombing on German infrastructure and manufacturing capability. Consequently, by the time we bombed Dresden a year later the Germans were able to send up only 28 fighters to oppose 1,300 Allied bombers, escorted by 784 fighters.
I too am impressed with the quality of the leadership of the Air Forces during the war and the sacrifices of so many young lives during the European Air Campaign. Part of me, however, wonders if we occasionally over-reacted. In addition to tactical and strategic missions, were there other objectives? Did we intentionally level cities and kill civilians in Germany (and Japan) in an effort to destroy the will of the people to continue the war? The Germans killed sixty thousand English civilians in their air raids; our raids on Germany killed ten times as many non-combatants. Or was there a category of vengeance? Was there any strategic justification for the complete destruction of cultural center Dresden by 1,300 heavy bombers in the last weeks of the war?
Our thanks to the speaker for a memorable presentation and to the Historical Society for their program series. Mr. Flickinger demonstrated that the quality of a presentation depends upon thorough knowledge of the subject, the judgment to realize which portions of it are relevant, and the ability to communicate his/her message to the audience. The Historical Society program series for 2024/2025 will resume in September.